From Plurality to Unity: A Theory of World Unification

In these papers I have maintained that world government represents a transition away from the present divided state of humanity to one of unity, where divisions are eliminated. This is in contrast to other visions of world government, which are instead grounded in a view of plurality, where divisions are preserved on an equal basis. Here I present a high-level theory of a historical shift, in which unity and universalism can be expected to follow as part of a trend away from group dominance towards equality. It is intended to be at a high-level of abstraction, and for a long-term period spanning centuries, and will of course not be completely accurate for every single instance.

There was a time in history when every group believed their way of life or traits to be superior, and their way of life ‘civilized’, as opposed to some ‘others’ who were considered uncivilized, barbarians, or heretics. Let us call this Stage 1, characterized by supremacism and the desire for domination. Be it matters of culture, religion, habits, etc., groups either sought to convert others to their way of life or to dominate and oppress them. This stage also involved a strong distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup, with preferential treatment, discrimination, and hostility being widespread. Furthermore, each group also considered the way they understood the world to be the objective, absolute truth.

Over the past 200 years or so, Stage 1 increasingly became unsustainable both morally and practically. Social, political, and technological changes made it unviable for one group to be able to dominate another entirely the way they wanted to—this can be witnessed both in the collapse of colonialism and the decline in viability of territorial conquest. The unchecked desire for dominance has been somewhat tamed by the mutual advantages of peace over excessive conflict. Meanwhile, the rise of equality as a human ideal detracted and gradually led people away from outright supremacism, as seen in the abolition of slavery or struggles for the rights of marginalized people. The focus has shifted towards more acceptance of ‘others’ and maintaining differences with equal status.

This ‘equality in difference’ approach is what characterizes the pluralist approach that humanity has moved to in recent times. I shall call this Stage 2, which has the premise of recognizing equally the values, beliefs, and subjectivity of each group. In this stage principles such as intergroup harmony, tolerance, recognition, self-determination, and group rights have much salience. Meanwhile, the idea that ‘every group is right in their own way’ has given rise to the linked position of relativism, which ditches the notion of absolutes for humanity entirely from the social and political sphere. This state of pluralism comes close to describing the present world; while not fully realized and highly contested, it has been enshrined in many nations’ political systems, and is the foundation of the international order with its emphasis on state sovereignty.

Yet the relativist notion of denying any absolutes at all comes with its own problems. One might as well say that 2+3 need not be 5, since one could refer to it as 10 in a base-5 system or as 101 in binary. According to relativism, there would thus be no absolute answer to 2+3, but only different perspectives and interpretations. Should we give up on mathematics then? Of course not, because relativism is missing the point. The difference in representation of a concept does not change the absolute truth underlying it. In society and politics as well, the goal is to find the universality under what seem on the surface to be irreconcilable and primordial differences among groups. Sceptical relativists would deny that any such universality exists at all, but we can only find out if we ditch the relativist approach and actively seek or construct it. Relativism is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

More concerningly, by not holding humanity to absolute standards, relativism is permissive of any evil that a group could perpetuate (if it has the recognition and numbers). If each group is entitled to their own standards, then even such horrendous practices such as human sacrifice, slavery, and body mutilation are permissible in the name of a group’s culture or practices. Relativism is, as many have pointed out, ‘morally lazy’; it is a mechanism for people to shirk from their moral responsibility to stand up for the welfare of all human beings. It results in the moral alienation of people from all outside their group, making them quite content to let all sorts of evils pass in other groups. But it is also a product of alienation, since it also entails holding difference above welfare.

The instant the concepts of pluralism and relativism are fully realized, however, they become logically self-negating: for if all groups and their beliefs and practices are equally good, then why should a plurality of groups be preserved at all? Under perfect pluralism, one should have no objection if their group or its characteristics were replaced by another group, and there is no particular reason to preserve that specific group. Hypothetically there should thus be no barrier to the natural dynamics that would result in the extinction of some groups/traits and the universalization of others, until the plurality of the world is replaced by complete universality.

In reality, even the most avowed pluralists often stand up to defend their groups from decline. Why would they do so? The only reason seems to be the continuation of Stage 1 supremacism, albeit in a diminished and highly different form. Sometimes the discourse takes the form of contextualization: while all groups may be equal, our own is best suited to our specific conditions, as are the others to theirs. (But again, if these were genuinely well-suited they would continue to be naturally adopted and not need to be propped up by supremacists.) Another common kind of narrative is outcomes-based: while we respect all groups/cultures as equal, we believe that ours produces desirable behaviours and social outcomes. This too is a supremacist view, only directed implicitly with less outright hostility. A third type seemingly removes the comparative element and highlights only the positives of one group without mentioning others, seen for instance in moderate versions of patriotism. Yet again, why prefer a group unless it is better than others?

It is only such Stage 1 activity that sustains whatever we know as pluralism today—for as soon as the last vestiges of supremacism disappear and perfect sentiments of equality achieved, it will begin to implode. For in the absence of any feeling of superiority, there is no reason for people to attach to one group or its traits over another. And they should then let all the traits grow or fade naturally, guided by individual preferences, towards whatever natural state they tend toward.

The appeal to preservation of diversity is itself not sufficient as a justification for plurality—and is often merely a front for the disguised group supremacism described above. For the concept of diversity in pluralism is applied very specifically to existing groups only, and only recognizes the differences between these groups. Despite professing diversity, pluralism is neither conducive to the emergence of new groups (as the experience of micronations and new religions has shown, Fed. 20), nor is it supportive of individuals who deviate from the existing groups, even though they are furthering diversity. The benefits of diversity have been confused with having a mere multitude of group identities (Fed 28), but diversity would actually be better realized through recognizing true individual differences than identities (Fed 13).

There continues to be a significant backlash to pluralism (especially in recent times), coming from conservatives, identitarians, and critics of the ‘woke’ approach pushing for plurality as an intrinsic end. Nevertheless, pluralism is not only widely accepted normatively but has also created the imperative of ‘political correctness’, so I see it as unlikely that there will be a fully-fledged return to Stage 1. Proponents of pluralism counter that these critics are being supremacists of the Stage 1 type, which is contrary to equality and acceptance of difference. But as I have argued, pluralism itself is underpinned by group supremacism. Thus there remains significant supremacism underlying the discourse despite the profession of equality in difference.

The contradictions of the pluralist Stage 2 set the conditions for the progression of humanity into Stage 3, a condition of moral and cultural universalism. This is not a condition of homogeneity, but one where ideas come and go, people are free to choose which practices to adopt, within a framework of overarching principles on which there is worldwide (but not necessarily universal) consensus. Instead of the mere tolerance or coexistence of pluralism, with its appreciation and acknowledgment of differences, here we see the end of such differentiation in favour of unity and universality.

This stage of universality is essential to realizing morality and justice in the world, because only when we agree on universal standards rather than subjective ones can we hold people and their actions to these standards. As stated earlier, relativism allows people to potentially get away with anything in the name of subjective standards. But it is only by reference to universal standards that human rights, crimes against humanity, global justice, and similar principles attain any meaning and hence become actionable. These have long been important ideals in political theory but have struggled to gain relevance in a divided, subjective worldview. With global unification they shall finally gain the importance they deserve.

It is the transition into Stage 3 which in my view makes world unification inevitable, by providing the foundation upon which a universal political order can be founded. It also does not seem to lie very far into the future, for the conditions are becoming set for the beginning of the transition. Already supremacism has become mostly unviable (‘politically incorrect’) in politics and society, and the pluralism and relativism of Stage 2 is widely popular. With further pursuit of pluralism and equality and the decline of supremacism, we are coming closer to the transition into the stage of universality.

Given the strength of group identification witnessed at present some people may doubt that such a stage will ever occur, or may feel uncomfortable about global universalism. But it is only the logical extension of how we deal with all the other groups in society. Do we, for example, encourage plurality when it comes to zodiac signs or recognize each sign as having its unique subjectivity? No, and for all the hundreds of other possible differences we just stamp out the distinction as irrelevant and dismiss any attempts to divide society along them (Fed. 13). The few politically salient identities must go a similar way.

Global unification can therefore be seen as not just a possibility, but as a logical next step from where humanity is today following the stages of supremacism and plurality. I note, however, that the purpose of this theory is not to push for the inevitability of a world government, or to depict history as following some grand teleological course. In formulating this view, the main objective is instead to provide theoretical backing to the concept of world government, and to give an account of how it can be a natural progression from the divided world of today.